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A Response to The Sound ofSilence
Andrew King-Ries*
In his article, The Sound of Silence: Holding Batterers Accountable for
Silencing Their Victims, Tom Lininger attempts to "facilitate the effective
prosecution of domestic violence cases, particularly domestic homicide,
while complying with the new requirements announced [for forfeiture by
wrongdoing] by the Supreme Court in Giles [v. California]."' In doing so,
Lininger tackles a wide array of topics, including analyzing the "theoretical
underpinnings" of forfeiture by wrongdoing; explicating the Giles decision,
criticizing Justice Scalia's originalist approach for its "selective historical
research . . . conflation of evidentiary and constitutional forfeiture theories,
and . . . vacillation between objective and subjective standards for assessing
intent"; 3 developing a "new jurisprudential framework" for forfeiture
analysis;4 and proposing amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(6)-the federal forfeiture by wrongdoing rule.
While many of these topics are interesting and worthy of scholarly
response, I intend to limit my comments to Lininger's proposed solution to
the conundrum created by the Giles v. Calfornia' decision. The Court in
Giles held that forfeiture by wrongdoing is limited to when the prosecution
can prove the defendant intended to prevent the victim from testifying
against him.6 Prior to Giles, many courts had held that the defendant's intent
for forfeiture by wrongdoing could be inferred when the defendant killed his
victim. The Giles Court disagreed, finding it was inappropriate to infer the
defendant's intent. Many contend that this decision creates a perverse
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Montana School of Law.
1. 87 TEXAS L. REv. 857, 858 (2009).
2. Id. at 888.
3. Id. at 864.
4. Id. at 887.
5. 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
6. Id. at 2693.
7. Lininger, supra note 1, at 872.
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incentive for domestic violence defendants to kill their intimate partners in
order to best capitalize on their confrontation rights.8 As one who has
viewed forfeiture by wrongdoing as a potential solution to the battering
dynamics in domestic violence cases, I find myself intrigued by Lininger's
efforts to create "bright-line" rules, even after Giles, for when it is
appropriate to infer the defendant intended to prevent the victim from
testifying. While I ultimately find Lininger's proposed "bright-line" rules
incomplete, I wholeheartedly agree with his effort to create situations in
which inferring intent is constitutionally appropriate. In this way, courts can
address the reality of domestic violence and prevent the defendant benefitting
from additional violence.
In its 2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington,9 the U.S. Supreme
Court revived a criminal defendant's right to confront witnesses in court. 10
Including Crawford, the Court's recent Confrontation Clause cases-
Crawford v. Washington, Davis v. Washington,11  and Hammon v.
Indiana-2 forced a dramatic shift in how domestic violence cases are
prosecuted. Today, the state can largely only prosecute when the victim
appears in court and provides in-court testimony. 13  As Lininger notes,
however, domestic violence victims are subject to incredible pressure-
through threats and violence-from their battering partners not to testify.14
Unfortunately, the revived right of the defendant to confront the victim in
court creates an increased incentive on the part of the defendant to prevent
the victim from testifying against the defendant. As Lininger describes it, the
Confrontation Clause creates an "obvious defense strategy: beating the
charge by beating the accuser."15
Several commentators have looked to the doctrine of forfeiture by
wrongdoing as a potential solution for domestic violence prosecutions after
Crawford. Forfeiture by wrongdoing allows the prosecution to combat the
defendant's incentive to prevent victims from testifying. Put simply,
forfeiture by wrongdoing prevents a defendant from using the Confrontation
Clause as both a sword and a shield: the defendant cannot cause the victim to
be absent and then assert his right to confront the absent witness.16 If the
defendant is the reason for the victim's absence, under forfeiture by
wrongdoing, the defendant waives his right to confront the missing witness.
8. Id. at 863-64.
9. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
10. Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747. 755 (2005).
11. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
12. Id. (consolidated with Davis).
13. Tom Lininger, Bearing the Cross. 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 1353. 1365 (2005).
14. Lininger, supra note 1, at 868-69.
15. Id at 864.
16. Id at 861.
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Interestingly, it was the Court's decisions in Crawford, Davis, and
Hammon, that propelled commentators, courts, and county attorneys to look
to forfeiture by wrongdoing.17  As Lininger notes, the Court appeared to
recognize an expansive doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing as a vital
counterbalance to enhanced confrontation rights." In his compelling
discussion of a series of brutal domestic violence murder prosecutions,
Lininger describes how most courts were willing to find forfeiture by
wrongdoing when the defendant killed the victim, regardless of whether the
murder was for the intent of preventing the victim from testifying. Prior to
Giles, most courts were willing to infer the defendant's intent to prevent the
victim from testifying when the defendant killed the victim, thus opening the
door to admission of the deceased victim's hearsay statements.19
In Giles, the Supreme Court disagreed with the majority of lower courts
and found that forfeiture by wrongdoing can only be established when the
prosecution proves the defendant's intent to prevent the victim from
testifying. While Lininger acknowledges that Giles was a "setback for
prosecutors of domestic violence," he contends that the opinion "also gave
hope that a carefully crafted forfeiture argument could prevail even when the
accused has not expressly threatened reprisals for testimony." 21 Lininger
then sets out to explicate what he refers to as "Giles's inferred-intent
standard."22 Lininger's efforts in this area are important and compelling: he
seeks to provide lower courts with a "new jurisprudential framework" to
assist with application of forfeiture by wrongdoing.
According to Lininger, the "best way to facilitate lower courts'
interpretation of the forfeiture doctrine exception after Giles is to adopt
bright-line rules." 23 Lininger proposes "bright-line" rules to address five
critical post-Giles questions:
First, what showing of unavailability is sufficient to invoke the
forfeiture doctrine? Second, what types of wrongful conduct could
support a finding of forfeiture? Third, how should courts assess
causation? Fourth, what evidence is sufficient to show that the
accused intended to silence a prospective witness within the meaning
of Giles? Fifth, can the prosecution show the requisite mental state if
17. Since the Crawford decision, many states have either legislatively or judicially adopted
forfeiture by wrongdoing.
18. Lininger, supra note 1, at 872 73.
19. Id. at 861.
20. Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2693 (2008).
21. Lininger, supra note 1, at 887.
22. Id at 888.
23. Id at 892.
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the defendant had mixed intentions, such as the desire for revenge
coupled with the intent to silence?24
Lininger identifies the fourth question as the "greatest challenge" after
Giles.25  Drawing support from language in Justice Scalia's opinion and
Justice Souter's concurrence, which Lininger contends "suggests the
possibility of inferring intent from a pattern of past conduct, even conduct
that did not seem motivated in an immediate sense by an intent to make the
victim unavailable for testimony at trial,"26 Lininger advocates "an expansive
interpretation of the intent-to-silence requirement."27 To this end, Lininger
proposes three per se inferred-intent situations: violation of a restraining
order; defendant's violence toward the accuser after she made a police report
or initiated any judicial proceedings; and defendant's history of repeated
abuse against the accuser "over a long period [of time]."28 According to
Lininger, if the prosecution can establish one of these three situations, then
the intent element of forfeiture by wrongdoing is satisfied, regardless of
whether the defendant's conduct expressly made any reference to keeping the
victim from testifying. Lininger's three per se inferred-intent situations are a
critical component of his article and demand further exploration.
According to Lininger, courts should find that the defendant's intent to
prevent the victim from testifying is established when the defendant violates
a restraining order issued for the protection of the victim.29 The violation can
occur in the case for which the defendant is on trial or in an unrelated case.
In support of his position, Lininger argues that:
A restraining order is a lifeline connecting the petitioner to a court
system that can protect her. Defendants who violate such restraining
orders are seeking to sever that lifeline, interposing themselves
between the petitioner and the court system. In a word, the defendant
is seeking to "isolate" the petitioner from the legal system.30
In addition, Lininger suggests that the defendant's violation of a
restraining order is particularly important because the victim's obtaining the
restraining order indicates that she may testify against the defendant. 31
Finally, Lininger argues that a violation of a restraining order raises the same
concerns about preserving the integrity of the judicial system that underlie
forfeiture by wrongdoing. 32
24. Id at 893.
25. Id at 897.
26. Lininger, supra note 1, at 895.
27. Id
28. Id. at 900.
29. Id at 898-900.
30. Id at 898-99.
31. Id at 899.
32. Id at 899-900.
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Lininger would also find inferred intent when the defendant commits
"any act of violence against that accuser after she had made a police report or
initiated any judicial proceedings." 3 In support of this proposed rule,
Lininger points to studies documenting high rates of violence against
domestic violence victims during the pendency of the prosecution and
showing that victims experience the most severe violence after reporting
some other domestic violence incident. According to Lininger, these studies
"suggest the urgent need for-and the potential efficacy of'-his per se
rule.
Lininger's third proposed per se rule to infer intent is when the
government can establish that the defendant has "repeatedly abused the
declarant over a long period."3  Both Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court
and Justice Souter's concurrence support the notion that repeated acts of
violence are relevant to a finding of forfeiture. According to Justice Souter,
"the element of intention would normally be satisfied by the intent inferred
on the part of the domestic abuser in the classic abusive relationship, which
is meant to isolate the victim from outside help, including the aid of law
enforcement and the judicial process."36  Lininger observes that repeated
violence over a period of time refutes any suggestion that the violence is
attributable to provocation rather than to an intent to isolate the victim from
- -37the criminal justice system.
Lininger proposes a per se rule for a pattern of abuse, but acknowledges
the difficulty in creating the boundaries of such a rule:
The best test would quantify the amount of domestic violence that
necessarily entails the intent to silence. The involvement of social
scientists would be necessary to calibrate this test precisely. Perhaps
the rule could indicate a minimum number of acts involving severe
domestic violence causing injury, or perhaps the rule could specify a
minimum number of violent acts, irrespective of their severity,
occurring within a two-year period preceding the victim's
unavailability for testimony in the instant prosecution. A fixed
number of acts might seem unduly rigid, but it would reflect the
reality that no defendant innocently commits domestic violence on
. . 38
multiple successive occasions.
As someone who has also advocated for an expansive interpretation of
forfeiture by wrongdoing in the domestic violence context, I applaud
Lininger's efforts to highlight the importance of forfeiture to successful
33. Id at 900.
34. Id.
35. Id
36. Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2695 (2008) (Souter, J.. concurring).
37. Lininger, supra note 1, at 901.
38. Id at 901-02.
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domestic violence prosecutions. Lininger contends that bright-line rules
should make courts less "inhibit[ed] . . . from applying Giles's inferred-intent
test."3 9 Lininger's desire for bright-line rules for domestic violence cases is
understandable. Bright-line rules of inferred intent can assist the prosecution
to overcome the paucity of evidence of the defendant's intent to prevent the
victim's testimony. It may seem particularly appropriate to infer intent when
the paucity of evidence stems from the defendant's actions and from the
nature of the defendant's criminal conduct: domestic violence is a crime that
typically occurs in private with no witnesses other than the victim and that
involves complex social and personal dynamics that inhibit disclosure of the
violence. In addition, bright-line rules for inferred intent seem most
appropriate in homicide cases. While Lininger suggests his rules could apply
more broadly, the need for inferred intent is clearest in homicide cases, and
this is where Lininger casts his arguments. Homicide simplifies the equation
because it eliminates issues of the victim's choice not to participate in the
prosecution and erases the primary source of evidence of the defendant's
intent.
I agree wholeheartedly with Lininger that courts can, and should, make
the connection between battering behavior and forfeiture:
There is congruence between behaviors by defendants to prevent
testimony and behaviors of batterers to prevent disclosure about the
true nature of the relationship. At bottom, batterers and defendants
often seek the same thing: to avoid responsibility for their criminal
conduct. Defendants want to avoid conviction. Batterers want to
preserve the relationship, by definition a relationship established and
maintained by criminal conduct. Therefore, it is possible to describe a
battering relationship as a form of forfeiture by wrongdoing: a
fundamental pillar of many battering relationships is procuring the
absence (inability to disclose) of the recipient of the criminal conduct
and the primary witness to the true nature of the relationship.40
Therefore, I am of the opinion that when the prosecution can establish a
battering relationship, it is appropriate to infer the defendant's intent to
prevent the victim from testifying for purposes of forfeiture by wrongdoing.41
To be clear, I see a battering relationship as one that is built on violence,
but which can involve other "non-violent" power and control tactics.
Physical or emotional isolation, economic control, repeated invasions of
privacy, and threats of violence can all be effective means of maintaining the
39. Id at 901.
40. Andrew King-Ries, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing: A Panacea for Victimless Domestic
Violence Prosecutions. 39 CREIGHTON L. REv. 441, 460 (2006).
41. Id. at 467.
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power imbalance in the relationship.42 I see the "abusive" relationship as
more than merely a collection of violent acts perpetrated against the same
victim.
For this reason, while I applaud Lininger's bright-line rules that make it
easier for courts to find a "pattern of abuse," I fear that those same rules may
artificially limit findings of forfeiture. For instance, a defendant's
confiscation of the victim's credit cards after the victim's reporting of a
violent incident might be far more persuasive than a punch, but it would fall
outside the per se rule regarding acts of violence during the pendency of the
prosecution. The per se rule regarding violations of restraining orders poses
another example. When a domestic violence victim obtains a restraining
order, it may be a "warning to the defendant that the petitioner may soon be a
witness against him." It is even more accurate to view a restraining order as
a signal to the defendant that he is losing power and control over the victim
and that the victim is willing to depart from the underlying rule of the
relationship: reluctance to disclose the true nature of that relationship. But
what about when a defendant violates a no-contact order? Many courts issue
no-contact orders during a prosecution to protect the victim and to preserve
the integrity of the proceeding. Often, the court will issue the no-contact
order over the objection of the victim. In these situations, it cannot be said
that the victim is signaling a willingness to testify against the defendant. The
defendant's nonviolent violation of the no-contact order would not satisfy
either the per se rule against violence during the pendency of the proceedings
or the per se rule against violations of a restraining order. The defendant's
violation of the no-contact order, however, would demonstrate the
defendant's intent to undermine the integrity of the proceedings-the very
type of conduct forfeiture by wrongdoing is designed to prevent.
I recognize that my discussion of Lininger's bright-line rules can be
conceived as categorical: every bright-line rule can be challenged for being
drawn in the wrong place. I am not as concerned about where the line is
drawn, as opposed to the line being drawn at all. I fear that the creation of
bright-line rules will turn a nonexhaustive concept into an exclusive list.
This has the potential to constrain the conception of the courts as to the true
nature of domestic violence, impede prosecutors in their presentation of
forfeiture, restrict police investigation of forfeiture, and limit the primary
public discourse-the criminal trial-about domestic violence.
Also, I question the appropriateness of Lininger's rules beyond the
domestic homicide context. I agree with Lininger that courts should broadly
construe the elements of forfeiture by wrongdoing in domestic violence
relationships, particularly the element of the defendant's intent to prevent the
42. Andrew King-Ries, Crawford v. Washington: The End of Victimless Prosecution?. 28
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 301, 304 (2005).
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victim from testifying. But do we have the same confidence in bright-line
rules inferring intent when the victim is not dead, but still refuses to testify?
I suggest that the answer is "no," and that this appropriately causes a
different weighting of the defendant's confrontation rights.43
In this light, as opposed to per se rules, I would prefer that courts be
willing to engage in a full discussion of the relationship-with particular
sensitivity to the dynamics of domestic violence relationships-as the
prosecution seeks to establish forfeiture by wrongdoing. In my opinion, a
broader discussion of domestic violence dynamics, and a broader application
of inferred intent based upon those dynamics, will provide prosecutors the
tools needed to combat domestic violence and will deter domestic violence
defendants from acting on the perverse incentive to absent their victims and
then assert their confrontation rights to avoid accountability for their conduct.
To this end, Lininger and I concur that courts can combat domestic violence
and do what Lininger seeks: give silent victims a "voice in court."44
43. King-Ries, supra note 40, at 470 72.
44. Lininger, supra note 1, at 911.
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